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Abstract. Neural cryptography is based on synchronization of tree parity
machines by mutual learning. We extend previous key-exchange protocols by
replacing random inputs with queries depending on the current state of the neural
networks. The probability of a successful attack is calculated for different model
parameters using numerical simulations. The results show that queries restore the
security against cooperating attackers. The success probability can be reduced
without increasing the average synchronization time.
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1. Introduction
Neural cryptography [1,2] is a method for generating secret information over a public
channel. Before two partners A and B can exchange a secret message over a public
communication channel they have to agree on a secret encryption key. Using number
theoretic methods, such keys can be constructed over public channels without previous
secret agreements of the two partners [3]. Any details of the algorithm as well as the
complete information passed between the partners are known to a possible attacker E;
nevertheless the final key is secret, it is known to the two partners A and B only, and
an opponent E with limited computer power cannot calculate the key. The method is
based on the computational difficulty of factorizing large numbers or calculating the
discrete logarithm of large numbers [3].
Recently it has been demonstrated that secret keys can be generated by a
completely different method [1], as well. This method is based on synchronization
of neural networks by mutual learning [4, 5]. The secret key is generated by the
dynamics of a complex physical process, namely the competition between stochastic
attractive and repulsive forces which act on the weights of the two neural networks of
the partners A and B. Two dynamical systems which synchronize by mutual signals
have an advantage over an attacker E which can only synchronize by listening to the
exchanged signals [2]. Finally the key is taken as the synchronized weights of the two
networks A and B.
The security of neural cryptography is still being debated [6–11]. Since the
method is based on a stochastic process, there is a small chance that an attacker
synchronizes to the key, as well. However, it has been found that the model parameter
L (the synaptic depth defined below) determines the security of the system: the success
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probability of the attacker decreases exponentially with L while the synchronization
time, i.e. the amount of effort for agreeing on a key, increases by L2, only. Hence, by
increasing the value of L the security of neural cryptography can be increased to any
desired level [9].
These scaling laws are not obvious at all. Neural cryptography is based on a
subtle difference between bi-directional and uni-directional couplings of a stochastic
process. Our understanding of these processes is still incomplete. Hence it is still
possible that a clever algorithm may destroy the security of the method.
In fact, there is a special algorithm of neural cryptography, the Hebbian rule
defined below, which allows a clear determination of scaling laws with respect to the
parameter L. Recently it has been shown that a special attack based on the majority
of an ensemble of attacking networks destroys the security of the method: the success
probability is constant for large values of L [11]. These results are the motivation for
the present investigation. We develop a new kind of learning rule which restores the
security: the success probability decreases exponentially with L. This new rule uses
learning by queries [12] which is a well-known principle in the theory of learning by
examples [13]. It is based on exchanging inputs between A and B which are correlated
to the weight vectors of the two networks.
It should be mentioned that there are a few other rules (anti-Hebbian or random
walk) with lower success probabilities for which the scaling properties with respect to
the parameter L cannot be found, yet. This means that we still do not know whether
the majority attack destroys the security of those algorithms, as well. Nevertheless it
is important to develop a rule which restores security for the Hebbian rule where the
majority attack is clearly successful.
Our findings allow us to reach the conclusion that for all algorithms suggested so
far the scaling laws for the success probability hold: the security of neural cryptography
can be increased to any desired level.
2. Neural cryptography
In this section we repeat the definition of neural cryptography. Each of the two
partners A and B uses a special neural network called tree parity machine (TPM). As
shown in figure 1, a TPM consists of K hidden units σk with weight vectors wk and
input vectors xk. The components of the input vectors are binary and the weights are
discrete numbers with depths L,
xk,j ∈ {−1,+1}, wk,j ∈ {−L,−L+ 1, ..., L− 1, L}, (1)
where the index j = 1, . . . , N denotes the elements of each vector and k = 1, . . . ,K
the hidden units. The outputs of these neurons are defined by the scalar product of
inputs and weights,
σk = sgn(wk · xk) . (2)
The final output bit of each TPM is defined by the product of the hidden units,
τ =
K∏
k=1
σk . (3)
Both partners A and B initialize their weight vectors by means of random numbers
before the training period starts. At each time step t a public input vector is generated
and the bits τA and τB are exchanged over the public channel. In the case of identical
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Figure 1. A tree parity machine with K = 3 and N = 4.
output bits, τA = τB, each TPM adjusts those of its weights for which the hidden
unit is identical to the output, σ
A/B
k = τ
A/B. These weights are adjusted according
to a given learning rule. Here we consider the Hebbian rule
w
A/B
k (t+ 1) = w
A/B
k (t) + τ
A/B
xk . (4)
After some time tsync the two partners are synchronized, w
A
k (t) = w
B
k (t), and the
communication is stopped. Then the common weight vector is used as a key to encrypt
secret messages.
Note that any possible attacker E knows as much about the process as A knows
about B and vice versa. But E has some disadvantage with respect to A and B: it can
only listen to the communication and cannot influence the dynamics of the weights in
A’s and B’s neural networks [2, 14]. It turns out that this difference determines the
security of the crypto-system.
It seems obvious that a successful attacker should also use a TPM with similar
training rules. In fact, it is advantageous to use many networks for an attack. Since
the method is stochastic (due to the random input) the attacker may synchronize as
well, but with a low probability PE. The security of neural cryptography is related to
the fact that PE decreases exponentially with the value of L [9].
In all previous learning rules the sequence of input vectors xk(t) was generated
by a public random number generator. Here we propose to take queries, i.e. input
vectors which are correlated with the present weight vector wk(t). At odd (even) time
steps the partner A (B) is generating an input vector which has a certain overlap to
its weights wAk (w
B
k ). It turns out that queries improve the security of the system.
3. Queries
The process of synchronization itself can be described by standard order parameters
which are also used for the analysis of on-line learning [13]. These order parameters
are
Qmk =
1
N
w
m
k ·wmk , (5)
Rm,nk =
1
N
w
m
k ·wnk , (6)
where the indicesm,n ∈ {A,B,E} denote A’s, B’s, or E’s TPM. The distance between
two corresponding hidden units is defined by the (normalized) overlap
ρm,nk =
w
m
k ·wnk√
w
m
k ·wmk
√
w
n
k ·wnk
=
Rm,nk√
Qmk Q
n
k
. (7)
Neural cryptography with queries 4
The maximum value ρk = 1 is reached for fully synchronized hidden units (zero
distance), while uncorrelated weight vectors have zero overlap (maximal distance).
The distance between two corresponding hidden units decreases, if the learning
rule (4) is applied to both of them using the same input vector xk. Thus coordinated
moves of the weights have an attractive effect in the process of synchronization [6,15].
But changing the weights in only one hidden unit increases the average distance
[6]. These repulsive steps between two corresponding hidden units can only occur
if their output bits are different [16]. The probability for this event is given by the
well-known generalization error of the perceptron [13]
ǫk =
1
π
arccosρk , (8)
which depends on the overlap ρk between the weight vectors of corresponding hidden
units. For an attacker using the same learning rule as A and B, repulsive steps in the
kth hidden unit occur with probability pr = ǫk, as E cannot influence the process of
synchronization.
In contrast, the partners update the weights in their TPMs only if τA = τB. In
the case of identical generalization error, ǫk = ǫ, we find for K = 3 that repulsive
steps in a hidden unit of B’s neural network occur with the probability [16]
pr =
2(1− ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 ≤ ǫ . (9)
So pr is lower for synchronization than for learning and the partners partially avoid
repulsive steps. This advantage makes neural cryptography feasible and prevents
successful attacks, which are only based on simple learning.
But E can assign a confidence level to each output σEk of its hidden units. For
this task the local field
hk =
1√
N
wk · xk , (10)
is used as additional information. Then the prediction error, the probability of different
output bits for an input vector xk inducing a local field hk, is given by [17]
ǫ(ρk, hk) =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ρk√
2(1− ρ2k)
|hk|√
Qk
)]
. (11)
The function ǫ(ρk, hk) reaches a maximum of ǫ(ρk, 0) = 0.5 for hk = 0. In this case xk
is perpendicular to wk and the neural network has no information about this example.
But for increasing |hk| the confidence of prediction rises and ǫ(ρk, hk) shrinks.
This effect is essential for the Geometric Attack [6], which is—up to now—the
most successful method for a single attacking neural network with a structure identical
to A’s and B’s [9]. Here E trains its own TPM, with the examples, input vectors
and output bits, transmitted by the two partners. If τE = τA, the attacker applies
the same learning rule as A and B. But for τE 6= τA E knows that at least one of
the hidden units has made a wrong prediction and searches for the unit k with the
minimum absolute value |hk| of the local field. Because this hidden unit has the
lowest confidence of prediction, its output σEk is most likely to be different from σ
A
k .
Therefore the attacker inverts both σEk and τ
E. Afterwards the usual learning rule
can be applied. As this geometric attack method reduces the frequency of repulsive
steps, E increases its success probability PE by taking the local field into account.
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Figure 2. Prediction error ǫ(ρ, h) as a function of the overlap ρ for different
values of the local field. The generalization error ǫ is shown as thick line. We
assumed Q = 1 for this diagram.
But the partners can influence the local field. Instead of using random inputs,
they are able to select input vectors with a fixed |hk| (queries [12]) in their own
hidden units. This essentially modifies the functional dependency between overlap ρk
and frequency of repulsive steps pr. In this case (11) determines the probability of
different output bits instead of (8).
Note that the chosen absolute local field |hk| for synchronization with queries is
lower than the average value
〈|hk|〉 =
√
2Qk/π ≈ 0.8
√
Qk (12)
observed for random inputs. Therefore the overlap
ρk,in =
wk · xk√
wk ·wk√xk · xk =
1√
N
hk√
Qk
(13)
between input vector and weight vector converges to zero in the limit N → ∞, even
if queries with 0 < |hk| <∞ are used.
Figure 2 shows the prediction error ǫ(ρ, h) for queries, which induce the local field
h. Compared to the case of random inputs, ǫ(ρ, h) is increased for small overlap and
decreased for nearly synchronized neural networks. By selecting queries with different
local fields, A and B can regulate this effect.
As learning is slower than synchronization, ρAE is typically smaller than ρAB. In
this situation queries with small values of the parameter h increase the frequency of
repulsive steps for the attacker without affecting the process of synchronization too
much.
4. Synchronization
In order to integrate queries into the neural key-exchange protocol [1], only the
generation of the inputs has to be changed. Instead of choosing completely random
xk,j , both partners alternately ask each other questions. In each time step either A or
B uses the algorithm described in Appendix A to generate K input vectors xk, which
result in h
A/B
k ≈ ±H . Then these queries are sent to the other partner and both
calculate the output of their TPMs. After the exchange of τA and τB, the Hebbian
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Figure 3. Synchronization time of two TPMs with K = 3 and N = 1000,
averaged over 10 000 simulations.
learning rule is used to update the weights as described in section 2. This leads to
synchronization after tsync steps.
As shown in figure 3, 〈tsync〉 diverges for H → 0. In this limit the prediction error
ǫ(ρk, H) reaches 0.5 independent of ρk. Therefore the effect of the repulsive steps
inhibits synchronization. But the choice of H does not influence 〈tsync〉 much, as long
as this quantity is large enough.
The dependence on L of 〈tsync〉 is caused by two effects:
• The dynamics of each weight can be described as random walk with reflecting
boundaries if the control signals σk and τ are neglected. Calculations for this
simplified model of neural synchronization show that 〈tsync〉 scales proportional
to L2 [15]. This behavior has been observed in neural cryptography with random
inputs [9], too.
• If queries are used, the probability of repulsive steps pr depends not only on the
overlap ρk, but also on the quantity |hk|/
√
Qk. Assuming uniformly distributed
weights, we find
〈Qk〉 =
〈
1
N
wk ·wk
〉
=
1
3
L(L+ 1) ∼ 1
3
L2 (14)
for the expectation value of the order parameter Qk. Hence we have to increase
H proportional to the synaptic depth L, if we want to observe the same frequency
of repulsive steps.
Using both 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 and H ∝ L we can rescale 〈tsync〉H,L in order to obtain
functions fL(α), which are nearly independent of the synaptic depth in the case L≫ 1:
〈tsync〉 = L2fL
(
H
L
)
. (15)
In figure 4 we have plotted these functions for different values of L. It is clearly
visible that fL(α) converges to a universal scaling function f(α) in the limit L→∞:
f(α) = lim
L→∞
fL(α) . (16)
Additionally, we find that the distance |fL(α) − f(α)| shrinks proportional to L−1.
Therefore we can use finite size scaling to determine f(α), which is shown in figure 4,
too.
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Figure 4. Scaling behavior of the synchronization time. The thick curve denotes
the universal function f(α) defined in (16). It has been obtained by finite size
scaling, which is shown in the inset for α = 0.5 (◦) and α = 0.6 (⊓⊔).
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Figure 5. Extrapolation of f−1
L
to L→∞. Symbols denote the values extracted
from figure 4 for the average synchronization times 100L2 (◦), 150L2 (⊓⊔) and
200L2 (♦).
This function diverges for α < αc. We estimate αc ≈ 0.36 forK = 3 andN = 1000
by extrapolating the inverse function f−1L as shown in figure 5. Consequently,
synchronization is only achievable for H > αcL in the limit L→∞.
5. Security
Up to now, the most successful attack on neural cryptography is the Majority Flipping
Attack [11], which is an extension of the Geometric Attack. Instead of a single neural
network, E uses an ensemble of M TPMs. At the beginning, the weight vectors of all
attacking networks are chosen randomly, so that the average initial overlap between
them is zero. Like A and B, the attacker only updates the weights in time steps
with τA = τB. If the output τE,m of the mth attacking network disagrees with τA,
the hidden unit with the smallest absolute value |hE,mk | of the local field is selected.
Then the output bits σE,mk and τ
E,m are inverted. Afterwards E counts the internal
representations (σE,m1 , . . . , σ
E,m
K ) and selects the most common one. This majority
vote is then adopted by all attacking networks for the application of the learning rule.
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Figure 6. Success probability of the Majority Flipping Attack as a function of
H. Symbols denote the results obtained in 10 000 simulations forK = 3,M = 100
and N = 1000. The inset shows the success of a Geometric Attack for K = 3,
L = 5 and N = 1000.
Because of these identical updates, E’s neural networks become correlated [11],
which reduces the efficiency of the Majority Flipping Attack. In order to slow down
this effect, we use the modifications proposed in [11]:
• The majority vote is only considered in even time steps. Otherwise E updates the
weights according to the internal representation of the particular neural network.
• At the beginning of the synchronization, only the Geometric Attack is applied by
the attacker. But instead of waiting until t > 13 tsync as suggested in [11], E starts
with the Majority Flipping Attack after 100 steps.
For the neural key-exchange protocol with random inputs and Hebbian learning
rule, the success probability PE of this method reaches a constant non-vanishing value
in the limit L → ∞ [11]. Therefore it breaks the security of this type of neural
cryptography.
In contrast, if the two partners A and B use queries for the neural key exchange,
the success probability strongly depends on the parameter H . This can be used to
regain security against the Majority Flipping Attack. As shown in figure 6 a Fermi-
Dirac distribution
PE =
1
1 + exp(−β(H − µ)) (17)
with two parameters β and µ is a suitable fitting function for describing PE as a
function of H . Equation (17) is also valid for the Geometric Attack, which is a special
case of the Majority Flipping Attack (M = 1).
Figure 7 shows the dependence on L of the fit parameter µ for both attacks.
Aside from finite size effects for small values of L, this parameter is proportional to
the synaptic depth of the TPMs:
µ = αs L . (18)
Obviously, the quantity α = H/L not only determines the synchronization time but
also the success of an attack. These effects are caused by the modification of pr due
to the use of queries. The other parameter β is nearly constant for L > 3. So both
αs and β are independent of the chosen parameters H and L, but depends on the
attacker’s method.
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Figure 7. Parameters µ and β as a function of the synaptic depth L. Symbols
denote the results of fits using (17) for the Geometric Attack (◦) and the Majority
Flipping Attack with M = 100 (⊓⊔). From these values we obtain αs,flip ≈ 0.45
(——) and αs,M=100 ≈ 0.38 (· · · · · ·) according to (18).
From these results we can also deduce the scaling behavior of PE as a function of
the synaptic depth. For both the Majority Flipping Attack and the Geometric Attack
we obtain
PE =
1
1 + exp(β(αs − α)L) (19)
for synchronization with queries and H = αL. In the limit L → ∞, the asymptotic
behavior of PE is given by
PE ∼ e−β(αs−α)L (20)
as long as α < αs. Here the success probability PE decreases exponentially with
increasing synaptic depth,
PE ∝ e−yL , (21)
which is also observed in the case of random inputs, if E uses the Geometric Attack [9].
Consequently, the neural key exchange with queries is secure against both
attacks. An attacker using the Majority Flipping Attack only decreases the value
of y = β(αs − α), because αs,majority < αs,flip, but does not change the exponential
scaling law (21).
For practical aspects of security, however, one has to look at the function
PE(〈tsync〉), which is shown in figure 8. Here we find that queries enhance the security
of the neural key-exchange protocol a lot for given synchronization time. There is an
optimal value of H associated with each L, which lies on the envelope of all functions
PE(〈tsync〉).
Figure 8 also shows that A and B can achieve higher security against attacks than
predicted by (19) with α = αc as long as L is not to large. This phenomenon is caused
by finite size effects which enable synchronization even for H < αc L. But, of course,
this does not work for L ≫ 1. Therefore the envelope and PE(〈tsync〉) for H = αc L
converge asymptotically in the limit L→∞.
Queries reveal additional information about the weight vectors of A’s and B’s
neural networks. However, an attacker E cannot benefit from this information, since
for a given value of H , there is still an exponential large number of weight vectors wk,
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Figure 8. Success probability as a function of the average synchronization time
for K = 3, N = 1000 and different values of L and H. Part (a) shows the result
for the Geometric Attack and part (b) for the Majority Flipping Attack with
M = 100 attacking neural networks. The solid curve in each graph represents the
success probability for neural cryptography with random inputs and the dashed
line marks H = αc L.
which are consistent with a given query. As an example, there are 2.8× 10129 possible
weight vectors for L = 10, N = 100, and hk = 10. Because of this large number, E
cannot gain useful information from queries.
6. Conclusions
Neural cryptography is a subtle competition between interaction and learning of neural
networks. Two neural networks A and B exchange some information about their states
over a public channel. The amount of information has to be so high that the two
networks A and B can synchronize. But it has to be so low that an attacker E can
only synchronize with a low probability which can be decreased to an arbritrary low
value.
We have shown that increasing the amount of exchanged information can be of
advantage for cryptography. We have included queries in the training process of the
neural networks. This means that alternately A and B are generating an input which
is correlated with its state and A or B is asking the partner for the corresponding
output bit. The overlap between input and weight vector is so low that the additional
information does not reveal much about the internal states. But queries introduce a
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mutual influence between A and B which is not available to an attacking network E.
In addition the method obtains a new (public) parameter which can be adjusted to
give optimal security.
We have applied this new method to the case of the Hebbian training rule which
was successfully attacked using the majority of an ensemble of attackers. We find
that queries restore the security of the method: the probability of a successful naive
majority attack can be decreased to any desired level.
Appendix A. Generation of queries
In this appendix we describe the algorithm used to generate a query xk, which induces
a previously chosen local field hk. The solution, of course, depends on the weight vector
wk of the hidden unit. This task is similar to solving a knapsack problem [18], which
can be very difficult. But we need only a fast approximate solution in order to use
queries in the neural key-exchange protocol.
As both weights wk,j and inputs xk,j are discrete, there are only 2L+1 possibilities
for wk,j · xk,j . Therefore we can describe the solution by counting the number ck,l of
products with wk,j · xk,j = l. Then the local field is given by:
hk =
1√
N
L∑
l=1
l(ck,l − ck,−l) . (A.1)
We also note that the sum nk,l = ck,l + ck,−l is equal to the number of weights with
|wk,j | = |l|. Hence the values of nk,l depend only on the weight vector wk. This can
be used to write hk as a function of only L variables, because the generation of queries
cannot change wk:
hk =
1√
N
L∑
l=1
l(2ck,l − nk,l) . (A.2)
In our simulations we use the following algorithm to generate the queries. First
the output σk of the hidden unit is chosen randomly. Therefore the set value of the
local field is given by hk = σkH . Then we use either
ck,l =
nk,l + 1
2
+
1
2l

σkH√N − L∑
j=l+1
j(2ck,j − nk,j)


 (A.3)
or
ck,l =


nk,l − 1
2
+
1
2l

σkH√N − L∑
j=l+1
j(2ck,j − nk,j)



 (A.4)
to compute the values of ck,L, ck,L−1, . . . , ck,1. In each calculation one of the two
equations is selected randomly with equal probability, so that rounding errors do
not influence the average result. Additionally, we have to take into account that
0 ≤ ck,l ≤ nk,l. Therefore we set ck,l to the nearest boundary value, if (A.3) or (A.4)
yield a result outside this range.
Afterwards the input vector xk is generated. Inputs associated with zero weights
are chosen randomly, because they do not influence the local field. The other input
bits xk,j are divided into L groups according to the absolute value l = |wk,j | of their
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corresponding weight. In each group, ck,l inputs are selected randomly and set to
xk,j = sgn(wkj). The remaining nk,l − ck,l input bits are set to xk,j = −sgn(wk,j).
Simulations show that the absolute local field |hk| matches its set value H on
average. And we observe only small deviations, which are caused by the restriction
of the input values to +1 or −1. So we can generate queries, which approximately
induce a predetermined absolute local field H by using this algorithm.
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